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counting the cost of learning
Dale C. Rielage
Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. 
Navy, 1898–1945, by Trent Hone� Annapolis, MD: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 2018� 432 pages� $34�95�
There are two widely popular narratives of the U�S� Navy in the Pacific during 
World War II� On the surface, they are contradictory�
The first narrative thread is that in the interwar years the U�S� Navy created 
an extraordinary laboratory for innovation and learning� Its perceived success 
finds validation in Fleet Admiral Chester W� Nimitz’s assertion that rigorous and 
repeated Naval War College wargames had ensured that “nothing that happened 
during the war was a surprise � � � except the kamikaze tactics�”1
But there is also a second, less triumphant story� The U�S� Navy’s victories at 
Coral Sea and Midway were darkened by repeated defeats in the waters off Gua-
dalcanal� Most recently chronicled in James Hornfischer’s Neptune’s Inferno, the 
loss of ships and sailors in the face of competently handled Japanese naval forces 
reveals an organization that failed in the crucible of combat�
Both narratives, of course, describe the same navy� While conflicting historic 
narratives are commonplace, the gap between these two views is more than an 
academic exercise for serving naval officers� As the U�S� Navy contemplates how 
to meet the challenge of great-power competition, the perceived lessons of the in-
terwar years have become a touchstone� Following the lead of the wider Depart-
ment of Defense, the Naval War College is seeking to reinvigorate wargaming� 
The U�S� Pacific Fleet has resurrected the name, and to some extent the model, of 
the interwar Fleet Problem exercises as a practical laboratory for advanced war 
fighting� If the intellectual ancestors of these structures produced hidebound 
conventional wisdom rather than high-velocity learning, much of the service is 
potentially on the wrong track and needs to look at other examples�
In his extraordinary new book, Learning War, Trent Hone seeks to reconcile 
these two views, producing a nuanced understanding of the U�S� Navy as an or-
ganization� In doing so, Hone manages to view the familiar through new eyes, 
a feat he accomplishes by making two distinctive 
choices in his analysis�
First, Hone focuses his attention on the surface 
navy, reversing the view of many standard works 
that emphasize the emerging naval aviation arm� 
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Hone rejects as simplistic and incomplete the conventional view that the loss 
of the battle line in the attack on Pearl Harbor forced conservative admirals to 
embrace, if only out of necessity, the potential of carrier aviation� Before World 
War II, naval aviation was a small, although controversial and important, part of 
larger questions of naval strategy and tactics� As a result, the U�S� Navy’s thinking 
on naval aviation formed only a part of how it adapted to the stresses of combat 
during the first years of World War II� Senior officers’ understanding of naval 
combat, including the employment of naval aviation, was formed through the 
lens of a fleet focused on its surface line�
Second, Hone approaches the U�S� Navy as a “complex adaptive system�” Ap-
plying his professional background as a management consultant, he approaches 
the interwar Navy as if it was a business client working to adapt to a dynamic 
competitive environment� Through this approach, he touches on the commonly 
cited mechanisms—the General Board, the Fleet Problem exercises, and Naval 
War College wargames—but transcends them to address more-fundamental is-
sues of institutional culture� While previous authors have described the relation-
ship among these institutions as a “virtuous cycle,” Hone expands beyond that 
simple description� Large institutions are inherently complex systems, which 
evolve through the interactive behavior of their individual elements and their 
wider environment� He eschews the neat cause-and-effect narrative of most 
histories, describing instead a network of officers with differing understandings 
of the profession, the environment, and their roles� This network interacted, 
adapted, and learned in a nonlinear way� Even if this formal systems approach 
is new to the reader, every naval leader who has guided or shaped meaningful 
change will recognize its elements instinctively�
Adaptability—which is to say, effective evolution—is not a given in complex 
institutions� Within the considerable latitude of USN doctrine, Hone discov-
ers a strong diversity of tactics, techniques, and procedures within and among 
individual commands and warfare communities� To modern eyes, this diversity 
represents a troubling lack of standardization� In Hone’s view, it was a strength, 
ensuring that the U�S� Navy entered the war with “clouds” of possible options that 
became seeds for rapid evolution� As Nimitz suggested, while not everything that 
came to pass in the war was expected, very little was unanticipated� Effective evo-
lution requires a place where it is “safe to fail�” The Fleet Problem exercises and 
wargames provided that opportunity� Hone, however, approaches these events as 
opportunities to test and share dynamic thinking rather than create it, focusing 
on the innovative culture of the officer corps�
This war-fighting diversity was bounded by a body of doctrine that created 
a common understanding among senior and midgrade commanders of how to 
view and react to tactical and operational situations� Hone takes the doctrine 
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discussion a step further, describing the “tactical heuristics” that guided the U.S. 
Navy (p. 123). Heuristics can be thought of as rules of thumb or habits of thought 
that rapidly suggest an “adequate, though often imperfect, answer to difficult 
questions.”2 For Hone, the cumulative effect of the interwar Navy’s culture, learn-
ing, and doctrine caused the officer corps to internalize three tactical heuristics: 
a bias toward aggressive action, an emphasis on quick and effective gunfire, and 
a culture of decentralized command and control.
In the early days of the war, when confronting expected challenges such as the 
Imperial Japanese Navy’s long-range torpedoes and night-fighting tactics, these 
heuristics guided the reactions of the fleet. While they inherently suggested im-
perfect solutions, in the dynamic environment of combat they were more right 
than wrong. For example, while gunfire was more or less effective given the tacti-
cal situation, generations spent training officers to open fire quickly at maximum 
ranges focused the fleet on attacking effectively first—a habit that translated into 
the employment of naval aviation.
Thus, Hone arrives at one of the most difficult issues for serving officers seek-
ing to understand the U.S. Navy’s performance in the early days of World War II: 
how to understand the two views of the U.S. Navy’s performance in the Pacific. 
What Hone suggests is that there is no dichotomy in the two accounts. Rather, 
the early defeats represented a dynamic and adaptable institution of learning in 
the harshest of environments. The diversity of thought and views allowed for a 
range of approaches to combat, with the best ones emerging as models for the 
fleet. The success of the U.S. Navy was not that it correctly anticipated every part 
of the World War II combat environment. Rather, it was successful because it was 
in the position to learn from the reverses that would have rendered a less adapt-
able navy a permanent loss.
Hone also suggests that, unfortunately, the factors that created this adaptability 
could not scale to meet the needs of modern industrial warfare. In 1938, there 
were just over 6,500 USN officers, growing to almost 39,000 by December 1941. 
By the end of the war, there would be more than 325,000 commissioned officers. 
In the massive wartime expansion, new officers and sailors could not be allowed 
the time and space to learn in the old familiar ways. Out of necessity, the Navy 
moved from exploration (learning new approaches) to exploitation (using pat-
terns that had proved successful). This approach was remarkably successful in the 
critical task of transmitting knowledge and culture to inexperienced personnel. 
While there remained pockets of innovation—Hone reexamines the introduction 
of the combat information center as one such example—the interwar approach 
could not survive through the conflict.
As the U.S. Navy considers a return to great-power competition, the paral-
lels to the interwar years are attractive. As in the 1930s, navies are working to 
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understand and exploit new technologies: cyber warfare, unmanned systems, 
artificial intelligence, and long-range sensor networks� Multiple peer competitors 
are making their own plans and assessments about the future� With the purchase 
of every new ship or system, the Navy makes a multidecade bet on how the old 
assumptions will change� Unfortunately, Hone does not paint a reassuring picture 
of the post–World War II Navy� Despite the peace, the Cold War required the 
U�S� Navy to remain a large institution, requiring standardized and repeatable 
approaches� Exercises and games that had been sandboxes for experimentation 
became mechanisms to refine and reinforce established solutions�
Nonetheless, the postwar Navy did learn and adapt to nuclear weapons, 
nuclear power, electronics, space, and long-range strike� If Hone is correct that 
the interwar model was unsuitable for the modern U�S� Navy, then the question 
of how the U�S� Navy learned and evolved after World War II presents a worthy 
subject for a separate book�
Until that volume comes along, Learning War represents one of the most pro-
found contributions to the discussion of high-velocity learning in a naval setting 
in print� Few historians have captured the past in a way that raises so many ideas 
and challenges for the present� As a result, no serious consideration of the U�S� 
Navy in World War II will be complete without reference to this volume�
Quite simply, if you are a serving officer and propose to read even one work of 
naval history this year, this book should be the one�
N O T E S
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